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Abstract. This article attempts to discern an impact of German philosophy on the 
Tractate of Józef Gołuchowski, which was submitted in 1821 to contest the seat of professor 
of philosophy at Vilnius University. The main ideas of Gołuchowski’s logic are taken 
from Kantian and Hegelian philosophy. The biggest influence on Gołuchowski’s theory of 
knowledge comes from Kant’s theory. In ontological considerations we can discern an attitude 
of Schelling on the identity of nature and spirit. The Romanticism of Gołuchowski expresses 
itself in the recurrent emphasis on the organic unity, on the principles of harmony of human 
powers. His moral philosophy is an attempt to combine the Kantian concept of morality with 
the traditional ethics of values.
Keywords: values, logic, theory of knowledge, metaphysics, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, 
Schelling, Romanticism.
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Introduction
This article attempts to discern an impact of German philosophy on the Tractate 
of Józef Gołuchowski, which was submitted in 1821 to contest the seat of professor 
of philosophy at Vilnius University. This philosopher of Polish origin (1797–1858) 
studied in Wien, Warsaw, Heidelberg and Erlangen. During the studies he attended the 
courses of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, 
published a study “The Role of the Philosophy in the Life of Entire Nations and 
Separate Individuals”1. Gołuchowski has won the contest and started lecturing at the 
fall of 1823. He drew great interest not only from students but also from many other 
citizens. Unfortunately, tsarist government found his lectures disloyal and after three 
months his course was cancelled. At the end of his life, already outside the university the 
philosopher wrote two volumes of “The Considerations on the Main Tasks in the Life of 
a Person”2. A Polish scientist Stefan Harassek accomplished a most thorough review of 
the creative activity of Gołuchowski in the book published in 19243. We shall analyze 
the work, which hasn’t been analyzed in this book, since the manuscript hasn’t been yet 
found at the time of Harassek’s publication.
Logic, metaphysics and moral philosophy constituted the traditional course of 
philosophy at the Imperial University of Vilnius. The Tractate written for the contest 
contains all these three parts with an additional part on teaching of philosophy and 
the list of recommended bibliography. On the same traditional grounds, which divide 
philosophy into theoretical and practical, Gołuchowski separates knowledge and practice. 
Logics and metaphysics are divided by the separate ways the thinking relates to its 
objects. The act of thinking the philosopher explains by clearly drawing the line between 
the passive pole of sensual impressions and the active pole of concepts, which organizes 
the former, emphasizing the point that thoughts are always related to their objects. The 
idea of Gołuchowski that thinking works on the matter by detracting qualities from their 
objects thus obtaining concepts is close to empiricism. In order to explain the cognitive 
activity, according to the author, we need to discern the principles of the process of 
thinking, while the subject of logics is to analyze the functions of conceptual thinking.
1. affinities in the concept of logic 
In Gołuchowski’s concept of logic one can find many similarities with that of Kant 
and Hegel. Similarly as for Immanuel Kant, the task of logic for the author is to analyze 
the conceptual thinking from its formal side, logic is taken to be not an organon, but 
1 Goluchowski, J. Die Philosophie in ihrem Verhältnisse zum Leben ganzer Völker und einzelner Menschen. 
Erlangen: J.J. Palm und E. Enke, 1822. 
2 Gołuchowski, J. Dumania nad najwyższemi zagadnieniami człowieka. Wilno: Nakładem i drukiem Józefa 
Zawadzkiego, 1861. 
3 Harassek, S. Józef Gołuchowski: zarys życia i filozofji. Kraków: Skład Główny w Kasie im. J. Mianowskiego, 
1924.
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a canon of what is formal in the application of the intellect. The author shortcuts the 
distinctions Kant makes in analyzing the forms of sensual intuition, their matter and 
relevant intellectual categories and summarizes them with a volatile expression that the 
mind encounters the things “with a veil of its own design”4. Gołuchowski only points 
out the principle “I cognize”, which conveys all the representations, however, he doesn’t 
keep up with Kantian apriorism, he doesn’t discern a transcendental logic and, as was 
used to be done, divides general logic into the pure and applied one, understanding the 
latter as a mean of purification of common sense and elaboration of thinking. Following 
Kant, the author stresses the difference between the logic and psychology, points out the 
empirical factors that hamper the ability of logical thinking, notes that human reason 
first cognizes the objects and only afterwards discerns the rules of their consideration. 
The thinker repeatedly emphasizes that the mere knowledge of logical forms wouldn’t 
help thinking, “a fool won’t obtain wisdom only by means of logic”5 and describes 
this capacity in a way Kant speaks of the power of judgment. Tractate echoes Kantian 
phrase that “this faculty is therefore the specific quality of the so-called mother wit, 
the want of which no scholastic discipline can compensate. For although education 
may furnish, and, as it were, engraft upon a limited understanding rules borrowed from 
other minds, yet the power of employing these rules correctly must belong to the pupil 
himself; and no rule which we can prescribe to him with this purpose is, in the absence or 
deficiency of this gift of nature, secure from misuse.”6. Kant even goes further and adds: 
“Deficiency in judgment is properly that which is called stupidity; and for such a failing 
we know no remedy. A dull or narrow-minded person, to whom nothing is wanting 
but a proper degree of understanding, may be improved by tuition, even so far as to 
deserve the epithet of learned. But as such persons frequently labour under a deficiency 
in the faculty of judgement, it is not uncommon to find men extremely learned who in 
the application of their science betray a lamentable degree this irremediable want”7. 
Gołuchowski, however, ignores this specific Kantian difference between cognition and 
power of judgment and treats the rules of conceptual thinking as inborn as well, stating 
that “multiple sources of our mistakes are hidden nowhere else but in ourselves”8. 
Explaining the structure of applied logic Gołuchowski distinguishes a scientific 
meditation; however, he doesn’t extrapolate its meaning. This term could have been 
taken from Kant. In “Logic” Kant defines the meditation as a consideration or methodical 
thinking and states that “meditation should accompany every reading and learning and 
therefore it is necessary that first we should make some preparatory investigations and 
only afterwards we organize our thoughts or connect them in a methodical manner”9. 
4 Gołuchowski, J. Rozprawa konkursowa. Archiwum historii filozofii i mysli społecznej. 1962, 8, p. 273.
5 Ibid., p. 275. 
6 Kant, I. The Critique of Pure Reason [interactive]. 2010 [accessed 10-12-2011]. <http://www2.hn.psu.edu/
faculty/jmanis/kant/Critique-Pure-Reason6x9.pdf>, p. 117.
7 Ibid., p. 117.
8 Gołuchowski, J., supra note 4, p. 272.
9 Kant, I. Logik [interactive] 2006 [accessed 05-11-2011]. <http://www.ikp.uni-bonn.de/kant/aa09/139.html>, 
§ 120, s. 150.
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The way functions of thinking are distinguished within the related systemic totality, 
the accents given to a necessity and exhaustiveness of particular logical chapters are 
similar to the composition of Kantian transcendental analytic. Admittedly, the principle 
of unity of reason, which grounds the variety of functions of thinking, is most common 
among the philosophers of the Romanticism and Gołuchowski stands here amongst 
them. The striving towards the systematic order of science, its deductiveness from the 
basic laws brings the position of Gołuchowski closer to the philosophy of New Ages and 
particularly to that of German classical philosophy. Many repeated intentions to reach 
this goal remind us of Kantian opposition between science and common understanding. 
The science according to Kant is only a systemic totality of knowledge, while common 
understanding is an aggregate of separate knowledge prior to its systemic unity. Kant 
discerns in his “Logic” as a separate part of logic “the common science on the method 
[...] which explains the form of science in general or the mode of connecting diverse 
knowledge into one science”10. Gołuchowski explains the synthesis in logic in a similar 
way. Paradoxically, he denies the possibility of identification of science with its system, 
however, grounds his position with a Hegelian style triad of unity, development and 
totality, which nevertheless implies some systematic order. On the other hand, the author 
doesn’t apply this negative requirement to the Logic.
Contrary to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Gołuchowski doesn’t treat logic itself 
as metaphysics or pure speculative philosophy, doesn’t give it a status of a science of 
becoming of reality, emphasizes that logic analyses only pure forms of thinking, while 
the truth itself is beyond its limits. Nevertheless, many aspects of his logic are close 
to those of Hegel. Similarly as Hegel in his “Science of Logic”, Gołuchowski stresses 
that the highest principle of logic should be grounded in itself and all the system of 
logic should be deduced from it. Another important point of similarity between logic 
in Tractate and Hegelian logic is the reference to the relation of internal organization 
of logic and language. Certainly, the relation of the analysis of language and logic has 
been known already in antiquity, therefore the opinion of Gołuchowski that the theory 
of language should be related with the exposition of logic might be derived from the 
tradition and the thought of Hegel stemming from it that the benefit of language is the 
possible magnitude of logical expressions within it. The parts of logic are discerned 
following the principle of dialectic triads, even though Gołuchowski doesn’t provide 
us with the totality of reciprocal subordination of all the triads, limiting himself with a 
reference of all the triads to the main and all explaining triad of the unity, diversity and 
relation of thought. 
An interpretation of the relations of the main logical concepts and laws based on 
the structure of thesis – antithesis – synthesis combines the elements of concepts of 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Josef Schelling and Hegel with elements 
of traditional logic. It is well known that Hegel gives a priority to contradiction rather 
than identity, therefore the idea of Gołuchowski that elimination of all contradictions 
is a basic principle of thinking refers to ideas of Fichte, where thesis is understood 
10 Kant, I. Logik [interactive] 2006 [accessed 05-11-2011]. <http://www.ikp.uni-bonn.de/kant/aa09/139.html>, 
§ 96, s. 139.
Societal Studies. 2012, 4(1): 7–18. 11
as a “statement of something to be an equal to itself”11. The concept of antithesis as a 
principle of cognition of diversity through a division of unity into various parts, their 
separation and contraposition is closer to that of Hegel, since noting that the principle of 
tertium non datur hasn’t been explained properly, Hegel stresses that “it is an important 
statement and its necessity lies in that identity passes into difference and difference into 
the opposition”12. The connection of the principle of sufficient grounds with relations 
in thinking relates it to the Hegelian theory as well, since noting that this principle of 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz has a deep meaning, Hegel stresses that sufficient ground 
is not only a totality of all external, accidental, mechanical causes, but encompasses a 
goal as a unity of all relations. Fichte relates the principle of sufficient grounds to both 
antithesis and synthesis, since first requires as a necessity a ground to separate equal 
things, while the second needs a ground to connect opposites. An echo of this position 
might be an idea of Gołuchowski that following the principle of sufficient grounds we 
unite or discern variety in the process of synthesis. Similar to Hegelian is a triad of 
concept, judgment and consideration. In his interpretation of a traditional logic Hegel 
takes concept to be a unity of different determinations, the merge of being and essence 
into the identity, the judgment for him is a division of the concept into opposition of its 
moments. This consideration for Gołuchowski is traditional as a connectivity of thought 
when deducing one judgment from the other. The triad of determination, differentiation 
and proof resembles that one distinguished in Hegel’s “Science of Logic”. Together 
with Hegel, Gołuchowski states that for the determination the most important is the 
unification of characteristics of the perceived being, for differentiation – the definition 
of difference between particularities and universalities. Hegel calls synthesis a scientific 
proposition (Lehrsatz), but explains that proof is necessary for knowledge itself, since 
it gives a ground for such a scientific proposition. Therefore, the understanding of proof 
by Gołuchowski through the relation and connection is similar to Hegelian thought, 
that synthesis in scientific proposition is a connection of opposites. Hegel doesn’t 
discern triads of logical possibility, reality and necessity, logical clarity, precision and 
consistency, thus we should look for other sources of these ideas of Gołuchowski. It 
appears that here he follows Schelling, who related possibility with thesis, reality with 
antithesis and necessity with synthesis13. Partially the concept used by Gołuchowski 
matches Kantian logic, where the principles of identity and contradiction are related with 
logical possibility, sufficient ground – with reality and the principle of excluded middle 
with logical necessity. Clarity, justification and systematic character serve for Kant as 
perfections of logical thinking. Therefore, here Gołuchowski might have interpreted the 
ideas of Kant, combining them with the above mentioned triads.
11 Fixte, I. G. Osnova obschego naukouchenija. Iz: Sochinenija v dvukh tomakh. Т. 1. Sankt-Peterburg: Mifril, 
1993, s. 101.
12 Hegel, G. W. F. Wissenschaft der Logik. Herausgegeben von Georg Lasson. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
1975, B. II, s. 56−57.
13 Schelling, F. W. J. Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen. 
In: Frühschriften. Eine Auswahl in zwei Bänden. Erster Band. Berlin Akademie-Verlag, 1971, S. 83.
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Though the major logical ideas of Gołuchowski are taken from German classical 
philosophy we can find some aspects of Romanticism in their exposition as well. His 
expression that without the unity of all functions of thinking, which ensures the unity 
of all and every science, “above which there is no higher principle and without which 
human wouldn’t have any meaning his life would be only sum of details without an 
organic whole. The soul then would get split into pieces neither action, nor thinking 
will be related”14. The pathetic sound of these expressions is close to the philosophy 
of Romanticism. Together with Romantics Gołuchowski elevates organicism, vivacity 
as the highest principle working even in the smallest details and uses many colorful 
expressions to present it. Nevertheless many logical propositions in the Tractate don’t 
seem to be substantiated. Compared with earlier courses of Logic taught at the University 
of Vilnius, this provisional course of Gołuchowski scarcely appears to be richer. A brief 
overlook of it demonstrates that Vilnius people seemed to be thirsty for novelties and the 
structural aspects of theory attracted them more than its justification. 
2. affinities in the concept of metaphysics 
The teaching of metaphysics was only included into the plan presented in the 
Tractate. Having started the lectures Gołuchowski changed the plan, didn’t teach 
metaphysics, while the subject of anthropology, which, according to the original plan, 
should have served as an introduction into philosophy, has got his major attention and 
was the only to be taught the whole first year. Presumably the Tractate was written 
only to match the requirements of the contest, while the teaching of metaphysics for 
Gołuchowski was taken alongside the position of Kant, who wrote in 1783 that “the old 
order of university studies still preserves the shadow of metaphysics, some scientific 
academies still supports one or another attempt to investigate it, yet it doesn’t belong to 
major sciences any longer”15.
 The task of metaphysics Gołuchowski describes rather in Kantian, than 
in traditional manner. First it investigates the laws that rule the things we cognize, 
analyzes the whole act of cognition encompassing the domains of senses, intellect 
and reason, searches for the basic forms of cognition and applies them for the major 
objects. Gołuchowski identifies metaphysics with ontology, however, ontology itself 
he understands as a theory of knowledge yet only while explaining the history of 
a term he mentions that Aristotle did use the term of gnoseology. The usage of the 
term “ontology” to explain the theory of cognition was usual in the philosophy of that 
time, for example, Kant suggested Ludwig Jacobi and Jacob Sigismund Beck to teach 
ontology through explanation of the conditions of knowledge, intellectual categories, 
principles of thinking. Following Kant, Gołuchowski acknowledges natural need for 
the metaphysics, a human strive to search for a purpose of being. In the evaluation of 
14 Gołuchowski, J., supra note 4, p. 275.
15 Kantas I. Prolegomenai kiekvienai būsimai metafizikai, galėsiančiai būti mokslu. Vilnius: Mintis, 1993, 
p. 164.
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human possibilities to cognize the universe and their own nature we can hear Pascalian 
notes. The man is explained as a participant of two worlds. He rests in an eternal nature, 
where everything is tied up by causal relations and also, together with other people, 
in a human sphere where he himself “finds the strength to start his individual life”16. 
Acknowledging the Kantian difference between the nature and humanity, Gołuchowski 
expresses an attempt common to Romanticism to contemplate their unity. Following 
Fichte, the author passionately describes never stopping wheel of the emergence and 
disappearance of all things, which raises a desire to recognize some higher reality, 
the existence of freedom and stability. First of all Gołuchowski suggests to search if 
metaphysics can prove that all things contain an eternal principle and traces of an infinite 
mind, that accidental changes are meaningful and there is a final purpose of the World. 
Gołuchowski criticizes the dualist concept of the world, the overestimation of a subject 
at the expense of nature common to rationalism and then to Fichte, yet still retains a 
Cartesian belief that the most reliable knowledge is on the thinking itself.
Gołuchowski states that combining speculation with an empirical knowledge we 
can objectively know the nature. Following Kant, Gołuchowski understands the nature 
in its pure sense not as a totality of things in themselves but only as its phenomena, 
found in our experience. An ambiguous usage of the term of nature explains us why 
the author insists that metaphysics don’t cognize the nature, however, soon afterwards 
states that applied metaphysics do. The text of the Tractate demonstrates that its author 
was not perfectly sure about the unknowable character of things in themselves. Though 
he insists that all knowledge is based on the laws of thinking, he also writes that objects 
reflect themselves in the mind “as in a mirror”17, that “objects appear for us as they really 
are”18. The Kantian concept of noumenon would be inconsistent with knowledge if a 
phenomenon is a mirror image of the noumenon and what is the noumenon “in reality”. 
Following Kant, our philosopher acknowledges that intellect, which organizes a sensual 
material, is not a highest power of reason. Attempting to prove the reality of an activity 
of such a higher power of reason he gives the same example as Kant – that of morality. 
A thinking of Reason for Gołuchowski is itself creative, it creates the ideas. Presenting 
Kantian analytical division of pure power of reason into three parts, Gołuchowski changes 
the terms – transcendental aesthetic and transcendental dialectic he calls respectively 
analytics of sensibility and reason. An applied metaphysics for Gołuchowski is a science 
about what “can be known undoubtedly beyond the limits of human domain”19. The higher 
part of the applied metaphysics refers to Kantian transcendental dialectic. Gołuchowski 
names the ideas of the human soul, the world-whole and God without giving a ground 
for their distinction. Kant uses the same concepts as the author to characterize these 
ideas, however, the definitions given by Gołuchowski are not the same as those of Kant. 
Gołuchowski shortens the disclosure of transcendental ideas and the differentiation 
of the spheres of metaphysics which are supposed to analyze them to such an extent 
16 Gołuchowski, J., supra note 4, p. 279.
17 Ibid., p. 281.
18 Ibid., p. 282.
19 Ibid., p. 289.
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that it becomes unclear, whether he supports Kant, who stresses that “I” is only a self-
consciousness of my thinking, thus one cannot describe it with a term of simple substance. 
Gołuchowski also doesn’t explain if the universe is an object created only by thoughts 
or its idea matches the reality and does absolutely unconditioned and necessary in itself 
being exist. He emphasizes that metaphysical ideas surpass the sensual representations, 
however, he doesn’t express his opinion whether these ideas are the scientific objects or 
only mark the limits of all possible theoretical knowledge. Nevertheless, the reference to 
the narrow sphere of investigations still retained for metaphysics allows us to think that, 
following Kant, the existence of substances corresponding to the transcendental ideas is 
kept for a justification by practical reason. We can use some elements of Kantian theory 
to explain why Gołuchowski separates cosmology from the philosophy of nature. The 
rational cosmology for Kant is a discipline which puts the boundaries unsurpassable for 
a speculative mind, while metaphysics of nature he treats as a science of natural bodies. 
As we have mentioned before, Gołuchowski doesn’t write, what status he allocates for 
the rational cosmology therefore there is no ground which justifies its difference from 
the philosophy of nature. 
It also doesn’t seem evident on what grounds Gołuchowski diversifies the lower 
applied metaphysics - the philosophy of nature – into hylology, organology and teleology. 
Explaining his plans to Karl Leonard Reinhold Kant uses the term “teleology” as a 
synonym for all “The Critique of the Power of Judgment”; later he recognizes teleology 
as a regulative principle of the reflecting power of judgment, which adds to the knowledge 
on organic beings. Therefore, we might guess that term “teleology” has been borrowed 
from Kant. However, other chapters of the Tractate devoted for the philosophy of nature 
have nothing to do with Kant neither in their names, nor in contents, since Kant divides 
them according to the structures of intellectual categories in his transcendental analytic. 
His metaphysical principles of natural sciences consist of phoronomy, which explains 
the movement only through its quantitative aspects: size, speed and direction; dynamics, 
which analyzes the movement through its qualitative aspect, emerging from fundamental 
forces of attraction and repulsion immanent to matter and acting on it; mechanics – a 
relations between the matter and these dynamic qualities and phenomenology, which 
describes the movement of the matter or its quiet status only in a relation with the 
way of their representation, that is through its modality. Thus the differences between 
Gołuchowski and Kant in understanding of philosophy of nature are quite evident. The 
approach of Gołuchowski is also distinct from that of Hegel. Gołuchowski treats the 
teleology in a narrower sense, limiting it with only sensually perceived nature, while 
Hegel elevates the return of absolute spirit to itself as a purpose of all development of 
Being. The philosophy of nature in Hegelian system is divided into mechanics, physics 
and organic physics. The matter is understood as a formless mass and it is analyzed in 
the chapter of mechanics, the bodies which obtain individuality are analyzed by physics, 
while live organisms – in the second and third parts of chapter devoted for the organic 
physics. Gołuchowski’s division of the philosophy of nature, though expressed in a form 
of triad, is not Hegelian. Apparently the thinking of Gołuchowski is closest to that of 
Schelling, who analyzed the continuum of organic and nonorganic nature and treated the 
nature as purposive, though not created purposively. 
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The ontological ideas in a contemporary sense Gołuchowski formulates not as a 
propositions, but as metaphoric guesses. Following Hegel either Schelling philosopher 
speaks about an infinite spirit, “which hides itself in unnumbered creatures surrounding 
the Man”20, expresses itself both in the circulation of spatial bodies and in the actions 
of miniscule beings. Schelling’s idea of the power of light, which together with the 
power of gravity creates the world, recurs in Gołuchowski’s story about the sun, which 
is common to our and kindred planets and which gives birth to a life; as well as about 
an infinite number of other suns performing the same deeds. Gołuchowski speaks 
in a Schellingian manner about the continuous stages of the development of nature, 
presenting themselves with an endless variety of creatures, yet holding them together 
in a harmonious whole. The idea of nature as of an intellect crystallized in the Being 
reflects itself in the phrase of Gołuchowski, that “the life, imprisoned in the mass of 
dead nonorganic beings, is only the deep thinking of nature on itself, in plants it already 
effloresces as a longing for the light, while on the higher level of living beings it obtains 
even a deeper sense”21. Recurrent comparison of nature and human being, stressing that 
their affinity is not only thought out, resembles an absolute of Schelling as an identity 
wherein an eternal becoming takes place and the mind and the universe are but its poles. 
Following Schelling, Gołuchowski depicts the world-whole as a live organism and the 
sciences about the world as necessary related into organic whole.
3. affinities in the conception of moral Philosophy
Gołuchowski explains an object, extent and limits of moral philosophy mostly on 
the basis of Aristotelian and Kantian theories. Moral philosophy is the main part of 
Philosophy itself, which analyses a human being not as a spectator but as an acting 
person. Because of the desire as the center of all human life, the man becomes the 
highest work of art among the creatures. The practical philosophy defines for a man 
what should be done, what should be counted for as a final purpose of all his deeds. 
The values are the source for all human activities for Gołuchowski. The first among all 
the values is happiness, perfection and virtue. Giving an explanation of the sources of 
these values he recognizes the Kantian principle of an absolute value of human person, 
denotes that morality is the highest goal of all our activities, that the reason should 
be understood as the source in itself of all human laws. In a similar Kantian manner 
he explains the principles of autonomy, free will, delineates a natural law and a pure 
moral philosophy. On the other hand it is the virtue not the duty, which deserves the 
main priority in the ethics of Gołuchowski. He points out that the duties come from the 
virtues and the teaching on duties he treats only as a part of elementary applied ethics. 
The final result of all moral philosophy according to Gołuchowski should be God and 
assuredness in his own immortality, and, together with Kant, stresses the impossibility 
to reach these ideas through speculation. We should only believe in them if we do not 
20 Gołuchowski, J., supra note 4, p. 303.
21 Ibid., p. 297.
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want to refuse of our mind. Gołuchowski states, that “the autonomy of mind, which is 
necessary for the morality, doesn’t prohibit the possibility for an individual man as a 
limited and sensual being to submit to another intelligent being, especially when this 
being in the visible order of things demonstrates himself as a highest and, being eternal, 
transcends himself all our powers of imagination. On the contrary, the recognition of 
the existence of this highest being is a moral necessity together with an understanding of 
moral laws inherent in our reason as of laws of its own”22. As well as the author of “The 
Religion within the Limits of Reason”, Gołuchowski holds the analysis of human evil 
and the necessity to extinguish it an important part of moral philosophy. The purpose 
of the moral philosophy is to find the final goal of human life and devote it all human 
activities, to organize one’s life according to the eternal ideals, to raise it above manifold 
everyday worries.
conclusions
The main ideas of Gołuchowski’s logic are taken from the classical German 
philosophy. Similar to Kant Gołuchowski explains the task of logic, emphasizes 
the difference between the logic and psychology, the necessity to build a systemic 
science derived from the basic laws. The parts of logic are discerned according to the 
dialectic principle of triads of Hegel and Fichte. These dialectic structures are used to 
interpret the concepts of logic and the relations of its laws. The biggest influence on 
Gołuchowski’s theory of knowledge comes from Kant’s theory, however, the text of 
the Tractate demonstrates that its author was not sure of impossibility to know things in 
themselves. In ontological considerations we can discern an attitude of Schelling on the 
continuity of nonorganic and organic nature, an identity of nature and spirit, a purposive 
character of nature. Kant’s influence is particularly clear in the moral philosophy of 
Gołuchowski. Here he attempts to combine the Kantian concept of morality with the 
traditional ethics of values therefore we can state that Gołuchowski follows Kant not 
consistently. Together with terms common to classical German philosophy, we can find 
many terms of Romanticism. The Romanticism of Gołuchowski expresses itself in the 
recurrent emphasis on the organic unity, on the principles of harmony of human powers.
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VokIEČIų FIloSoFIjoS REcEPcIja j. GoŁucHoWSkIo  
„koNkuRSINIamE tRaktatE”
Rūta Marija Vabalaitė
Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Lietuva
Santrauka. Straipsnio tikslas – analizuoti klasikinės ir romantinės vokiečių filosofijos 
įtaką Józefo Gołuchowskio „Konkursiniam traktatui“, parašytam 1821 metais, pretenduo-
jant užimti Vilniaus universiteto Teorinės ir moralinės filosofijos katedros profesoriaus etatą. 
Nagrinėjamos traktato logika, pažinimo teorija, metafizika ir moralės filosofija. Nurodoma, 
kad pagrindinės Gołuchowskio logikos idėjos yra perimtos iš klasikinės vokiečių filosofijos. 
Panašiai kaip Kantas, Gołuchowskis aiškina logikos uždavinį, pabrėžia logikos ir psichologi-
jos skirtumą, būtinybę sukurti sistemingą, išvestą iš pamatinių dėsningumų mokslą. Logikos 
dalys išskiriamos Fichtes ir Hegelio dialektikos triadų principu. Šios dialektinės struktūros 
naudojamos ir interpretuojant logikos sąvokas ir dėsnių sąsajas. Priešingai Hegeliui, autorius 
logikos nelaiko pačia metafizika arba gryna spekuliatyvia filosofija, mokslu apie tikrovės taps-
mą, pabrėžia, kad ji nagrinėja tik grynas mąstymo formas, o pati tiesa esti už jos ribų, bet 
daugelis jo logikos aspektų yra artimi hėgeliškiems. Kaip ir Hegelis, mūsų autorius teigia, kad 
aukščiausias logikos pradas turi remtis pačiu savimi, o visa logikos sistema turi būti iš jo išves-
ta. Didžiausią įtaką Gołuchowskio pažinimo sampratai daro Kanto teorija, tačiau traktato 
tekstas rodo, kad jo autorius nebuvo įsitikinęs daiktų savaime nepažinumu. Ontologiniuose 
svarstymuose išryškėja šelingiška nuostata dėl neorganinės ir organinės gamtos kontinualumo, 
gamtos ir dvasios tapatybės, gamtos tikslingumo. Pripažindamas kantiškąjį gamtiškumo ir 
žmogiškumo skirtumą, Gołuchowskis išreiškia romantizmui būdingą siekį mąstyti jų vieno-
vę. Kaip ir Fichte, autorius aistringai aprašo nesustojantį visų dalykų atsiradimo ir išnykimo 
ratą, sužadinantį troškimą pripažinti aukštesnės realybės, laisvės, pastovumo egzistavimą. 
Kanto įtaka pastebima Gołuchowskio moralės filosofijoje, bet aiškindamas moralės filosofijos 
objektą, apimtį bei ribas, mūsų autorius remiasi ir Aristotelio teorija. Jis bando suderinti 
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kantiškąją moralumo sampratą ir tradicinę dorybių etiką, tad Kanto teorija remiasi ne-
nuosekliai. Greta klasikinei filosofijai būdingų teiginių traktate yra vokiečių romantikams 
artimų idėjų. Gołuchowskio romantizmas reiškiasi vis pabrėžiamuose organiškos vienybės, 
žmogaus galių harmonijos principuose.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: vertybės, logika, pažinimo teorija, metafizika, Kantas, Hegelis, 
Fichte, Schellingas, romantizmas.
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